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It is hard not to recognize—as many commentators have1—the striking homol-
ogy between Alain Badiou’s theory of the event and the fate of Marcel Duchamp’s 
infamous 1917 ‘readymade’ Fountain. The congruence is in fact so marked that 
one of the easiest ways of grasping this key philosophical concept is simply by 
comparing it to Fountain’s simultaneously mundane and extraordinary story. Yet 
arguably the most important lesson to be drawn from this exercise is also the one 
that is most often ignored; to wit, far from presenting an unbridgeable divide, 
there in fact exists a paradoxical relation of continuity between the ‘event’ and the 
‘everyday’. This article seeks to redress this critical oversight by using Fountain 
not only to ‘flesh out’ Badiou’s crucial concept but also to explore the frequently 
overlooked (but no less necessary) imbrication of the everyday in the event, and 
in this way counter claims that Badiou’s philosophy presents a straightforward or 
even naïve division between conservative continuity and radical rupture.
That the event should be read through the readymade speaks volumes about the 
latter’s popularity and influence. Indeed, the tale of Fountain is by now so famil-
iar as to have become all-but prosaic: in 1917, Duchamp—the celebrated artist 
behind Nude Descending a Staircase of 5 years earlier—working under the pseud-
onym ‘Richard Mutt’, attempted to enter an industrially fabricated urinal chris-
tened Fountain into the exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists in New York. 
On the face of it, his artistic prank was an abject failure; not only was the urinal 
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refused entry into the exhibition, it was almost immediately lost (all that remains 
of the original ‘work’ itself is a photograph taken by Alfred Stieglitz, though Duch-
amp went on to create a number of ‘authentic replicas’ in the 1960s). 
Even so, the exhibition—or more precisely, non-exhibition—of Fountain is gener-
ally understood to be, alongside the great inventions of cubism and abstraction, 
one of the defining artistic events of the 20th century. We might even go so far as 
to say that Fountain’s non-exhibition figures the paradigmatic event in the field 
of art; the ‘event of events’, if you will. For Duchamp’s urinal doesn’t simply in-
troduce us to a new mode or form of artistic practice. Rather, under the name of 
‘readymade’, it changes the very idea of art itself. 
That this seemingly insignificant work’s brief existence has had (and continues to 
have) such a profound effect on the field of art signals its intimate relation to Ba-
diou’s theory of the event, which figures something like a sudden and unpredict-
able break with the logic of a world (a rupture which, under the right conditions, 
can lead to its complete transformation). That said, we should not be misled by 
the terminology here: that an event happens does not in itself mean that the every-
day world changes. To the contrary, one of the main things I want to demonstrate 
here, by way of an analysis of Duchamp’s readymade, is how the dialectic between 
the ‘everyday’ and the ‘event’ is in actual fact far more nuanced than it might at 
first appear. In particular, I want to use the example of Fountain to show how, far 
from being a ‘miraculous occurrence’, the event is in fact entirely caught up in the 
everyday, being (more often than not) less a revolutionary upheaval than an ‘in-
finitesimal subversion’ by which a miniscule, even insignificant alteration in the 
order of things might come to exhibit profound consequences. 
APPEARING TO DISAPPEAR: THE ONTO-LOGY OF THE EVENT
It is fair to say that the event is a crucial concept in Badiou’s philosophy. Given 
the fact that his initial declaration that mathematics is ontology effectively strips 
philosophy of its ‘highest responsibility’ (namely, ontology itself), we could even 
go so far as to argue that philosophy per se only really kicks in at the point of the 
event, which Badiou himself claims constitutes “the bedrock of my entire edi-
fice”,2 and which, as we will see, fundamentally escapes mathematical (hence on-
tological) thought. 
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But what exactly is an event? In spite of appearances, this is not such an easy 
question to answer. Very roughly speaking, an event is nothing more—and equally 
nothing less—than a localized and unpredictable rupture with the order of things, 
involving the sudden arrival on the scene of a radically un-known element (an ele-
ment whose address is, for complex reasons we will examine shortly, immediately 
universal), the consequences of which might come to affect the entire situation. 
Yet in spite of its momentous effects, an event is in equal parts rare, fleeting and 
fragile. A puncture hole in the fabric of the world, an event, if left unattended to, 
is all-too quickly patched up by the forces that dominate and govern the situation, 
forces that Badiou terms the state of the situation, and which effectively establish 
a ‘static’ regime of repetition. That the state must immediately quash the event 
is a direct—and, it should be pointed out, unintentional (the state being for Ba-
diou essentially a matter of structure, not conscious intent)3—consequence of the 
latter’s very novelty, which, in rupturing with the laws of the situation (namely, 
those of order and ‘stasis’), identifies itself as illegal and hence a threat. As such, if 
an event is to have any real effect then its happening must be in some way affirmed 
by an outside party. This affirmation—together with the radical possibilities it 
implies—constitutes the trace of the vanished event (generally taking the form of 
a pronouncement about these new possibilities: ‘x is both conceivable and achiev-
able…’; ‘it can be that y…’), meaning that even though the laws of the situation 
dictate that the event itself must disappear, it nonetheless leaves behind a mark 
of sorts in the form of an evental trace. 
The process of affirming (or ‘tracing’) an event is however far from a straight-
forward business. For as it turns out, we cannot know, strictly speaking, whether 
an event has occurred or not. The reasoning behind this is once again a little 
complicated, but essentially boils down to the fact that the ‘place’ in which an 
event takes place (namely, the evental site) is itself a point that, for structural 
reasons, must remain altogether unrecognized by the state (whose role it is to 
‘count’ the elements of a situation, and thereby designate which elements, le-
gally speaking, ‘count’). To this end there can be absolutely no knowledge of an 
event’s occurrence, for the simple reason that, in falling outside of the statist or-
der—thus in falling outside of ‘knowledge’ per se (everything that is ‘known’ being 
fundamentally known by the state)—an event is thereby completely withdrawn or 
‘subtracted’ from all predication. Moreover, an event’s being radically un-known 
means that its very happening must be, properly speaking, both indiscernible and 
undecidable: one can only make a ‘pure’ decision regarding its having taken place 
the schlock of the new · 139 
(the ‘purity’ of this decision residing in the fact that there can be no criteria upon 
which to base a decision concerning the occurrence of something which is radi-
cally un-known). 
So to sum up, an event illegally ‘interrupts repetition’ to introduce something 
new in the form of a heretofore unimaginable possibility. Its radically un-known 
status, however, means that its occurrence is, from the point of view of the situ-
ation (or the world) in question, both indiscernible (it cannot be recognised as 
such) and undecidable (it cannot be proven to have—or have not—taken place): 
with regard to deciding an event’s having-happened, as Badiou puts it, “it is given 
to us to bet”.4 
Yet even though we are now in possession of an adequate working theory of the 
event, we still do not know what it actually is. That is to say, it remains to be 
demonstrated ontologically. This is however once again a tricky business, not least 
because, as we mentioned earlier, the event fundamentally eludes mathematical 
thought: strictly speaking, an event is not, insofar as it falls on the side of “that-
which-is-not-being-qua-being”.5 Moreover, between the ontological foundations 
of Being and Event and the phenomenological investigations of Logics of Worlds, 
Badiou has in fact proposed two decidedly different conceptions of the event (as 
well as of various other crucial event-dependent concepts: the site, the subject, 
etc.), and even though we are here privileging the presentation offered in Badiou’s 
more recent work, there still remain substantial difficulties involved in marrying 
the two. Lastly, an event cannot be thought outside of its site (which provides, if 
only briefly, its worldly support), which itself errs on the wrong side of the laws of 
being and accordingly “appears only to disappear”.6
As such, before we can really grasp what an event is we must first come to terms 
with its site. So what then is a site? Put as simply as possible (and again, prioritiz-
ing the conception put forward in Logics of Worlds), it is a temporary aberration 
of the laws of ontology. Technically, a site is an object (that is, a multiple whose 
elements are indexed to a world’s transcendental, or a multiple that appears in a 
world)7 which, due to a momentary ‘kink’ in the ontological order, comes to count 
itself in the referential field of its own indexation. Or again, a site is something 
that “summons its being in the appearing of its own multiple composition”,8 and 
as such “makes itself appear”.9 All of which is to say that a site testifies to the intru-
sion of being in appearing. 
140 · alex ling 
Technically speaking, at the level of being, a site x proves itself paradoxical in its 
being a reflexive multiple, meaning it is an element of itself, it ‘auto-belongs’ (that 
is, x ∈ x).10 In its counting of itself in itself the site thus constitutes a supernu-
merary term—it is, as Badiou puts it, an ‘ultra-one’—and is as such, by dint of 
the axiom of foundation (which effectively prohibits a set’s belonging to itself), 
ontologically illegal. In transgressing the laws of being, the site must accordingly 
vanish. Lastly—and this really is key—in its giving its very being a value of exis-
tence, a site temporarily bridges the fissure separating ‘being’ from ‘being-there’, 
which is to say it involves “the instantaneous revelation of the void that haunts 
multiplicities”:11 the site convokes or ‘brings forth’ what is void in the situation, it 
presents what had been altogether unrepresented (by the state); in short, it brings 
into existence what had previously failed to appear. 
The ontology of the site thus consists of three fundamental (and, according to the 
laws of the situation, fundamentally illegal) points: it is a reflexive multiple; it is 
the revelation of the void; and it appears only to disappear. 
A site’s logic (that is to say, its phenomenology), on the other hand, essentially in-
volves the redistribution of the intensities of appearing around this vanished site. 
Of this distribution two immediate possibilities present themselves: either the 
intensity of existence briefly attributed to the site is maximal, in which case we 
are dealing with a real singularity (in convoking its void, the site reveals something 
radically new or un-known); or it is not, in which case we are merely dealing with 
a fact (the site fails to convoke the void; everything that appears is already known). 
Clearly our interest here lies with the former, which we can further divide into its 
strong and weak variants. Simply, while a weak singularity doubtless involves the 
brief (if absolute) existence of the site, only a strong singularity—that is, a sin-
gularity whose apparent consequences are maximal—constitutes an event proper. 
These maximal consequences can mean one thing and one thing only, being the 
sudden and absolute existence of what had previously inexisted. Or to be more 
precise: the maximal appearance of what had formerly been the inexistent object 
proper to the site itself; that which constituted, ontologically speaking, the void 
of the situation. It is moreover in this precise sense—in its relating to the situa-
tion from the basis of the void alone—that an event can be said to immediately 
address itself universally, insofar as the void invokes only “the flat surface of in-
different multiplicity”:12 in constituting the “absolute neutrality of being”, which 
is the single ‘characteristic’ common to everything (given that everything is), the 
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void “neither excludes nor constrains anyone.”13 
Considered as a site in extremis, an event (or a ‘strong singularity’) thus essentially 
effects something of an existential inversion, apportioning a maximal intensity 
of existence to that which had previously failed to exist at all. Further, since the 
event-site ‘appears only to disappear’, this absolutely existing former inexistent 
represents the sole testimony to the event’s having-happened, which is to say it is 
the very trace of the event, its lingering consequence. Thus Badiou can succinctly 
describe the event as equally “a pure cut in becoming made by an object of the 
world … [and] the supplementing of appearing through the upsurge of a trace: the 
old inexistent which has become an intense existence”.14 
This trace is however not logically inconsequential. Indeed, existentially speaking, 
every event involves a real life and death struggle. For a world’s regime of appear-
ing—each and every object of a world falling under the jurisdiction of its tran-
scendental ordering structure15—demands both a maximum and a minimum, and 
the forfeiture of either one of these positions requires that something else must 
take its place. Or again, if a world’s minimally existing object suddenly becomes 
maximally apparent, this mean another object is required to fill the vacuum that 
it leaves. The logic of the event thus accedes to Picasso’s famous declaration that 
“every act of creation is first of all an act of destruction”, on the proviso that the 
key terms are reversed: while creation and destruction are indeed necessary cor-
respondents, it is creation that comes first, each and every time. 
DUCHAMP’S CREATIVE ACT
Returning now to Duchamp’s infamous urinal, given the necessarily ‘novel’ nature 
of the event, one might immediately object to classifying Fountain as an event at 
all—let alone as the ‘event of events’ in the artistic field—on the grounds that 
Duchamp had already created numerous readymades beforehand (1913’s Bicycle 
Wheel and 1914’s Bottle Rack, for example). To do so however would be to ignore 
the essential situatedness of the event: of all of Duchamp’s readymades, Fountain 
constitutes the event proper due to the simple fact that it was the first to be ‘ex-
hibited’, and thus the first to appear in the situation (or the world) of art (even if 
this exhibition was, in truth, a non-exhibition).16 
In fact, as Barbara Formis has already in large part demonstrated, to categorize 
the readymade—or more precisely, the initial 1917 (non)exhibition of Fountain—
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as an ‘event’ is a fairly straightforward, even excessively neat exercise.17 For one 
thing, like the event, the readymade emerges in the situation at a very specific 
point, namely, a point that is radically unpresented; what Badiou, in the language 
of Being and Event, calls the ‘edge of the void’, or the situational site. Furthermore, 
it has an ‘exceptional’ structure that leads to its being designated illegitimate or 
illegal by the laws that govern the situation (viz., the ‘state’ of the situation; in this 
case the artistic cognoscenti of the Society of Independent Artists). This illegality 
means, in turn, that its emergence in the situation is followed by its immediate 
prohibition or censure by the state, meaning its appearance effectively coincides 
with its disappearance. Of course, this illegitimacy and unprecedentedness equally 
means that there are no established criteria upon which to ‘judge’ the work (or 
alternatively, there are no coordinates by which the work might be ‘positioned’ 
and hence comprehended), meaning that, for all intents and purposes, it appears 
in the situation—at least initially—as absolutely abstract, as singularly unfathom-
able. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, its momentary appearance ultimately 
leads, through at times slow and arduous means, to a wholesale transformation of 
the situation out of which it arises, namely, the world of art. 
Thus we already have at hand five major ways by which Fountain’s non-exhibition 
can be categorized as an event: it emerges from an evental site; it is illegal accord-
ing to the ‘laws’ of the situation; it appears only to disappear; it is incomprehen-
sible according to the logic of the state; and it results in the total transformation 
of the situation whence it emerged. 
More than this, the ‘readymade-event’—which, just to be perfectly clear, desig-
nates the non-exhibition of Fountain (as opposed to the work itself)—is paradig-
matic in the field of art because its effects are felt first and foremost at an ontologi-
cal level, that is, it involves the ‘being’, or the very ‘essence’, of art. 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. It is first important to point out how the 
Society of Independent Artists—of which Duchamp was a founding member—had, 
in the lead up to its exhibition, taken great care to publicly establish its inde-
pendence from what we might call the ‘state of art’. Its slogan, after all, was ‘no 
jury, no prizes’—a motto apparently suggested by none other than Duchamp him-
self18—while Article 2 of the Society’s regulations stated words to the effect that 
anybody who was able to cough up six dollars (the price of membership in the 
society) was able—indeed, obliged—to exhibit a work in the show. 
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So when Duchamp’s attempt to enter his industrially fabricated urinal into the 
exhibition proved unsuccessful, this immediately gave the lie to both the Society’s 
‘avant-garde’ credentials and, more importantly, its supposed ‘independence’, 
inasmuch as Fountain—or, more specifically, Fountain’s rejection, its ‘illegality’ in 
the eyes of the state—made the jury’s hidden presence only too explicit. As Du-
champ’s friend and contemporary Louise Norton declared at the time, “many of 
us had quite an exhorbitant notion of the independence of the Independents. 
It was a sad surprise to learn of a Board of Censors sitting upon the ambiguous 
question, What is ART?”19 Thus the work’s refusal clearly contradicted the ‘demo-
cratic’ claim of the exhibition and revealed the Society’s underlying conformity 
with, and lack of genuine independence from, the very institutions that represent 
the ‘state of art’.
The Society’s complicity with the state was only made even more explicit in the 
‘official’ reasons given for the urinal’s refusal, namely: that the object was not 
fabricated by the artist; and that the object was not in fact an original work at all. 
In other words, for an object to be accepted as a work of art in the situation ‘the 
world of art in 1917’, it had to fulfil two basic functions: first, it had to be physically 
constructed by the artist (i.e. it could not be manufactured by an external agent); 
and second, it had to be unique (that is, it must not be, pace Walter Benjamin, a 
copy of a previously existing object). Needless to say, under these conditions, the 
readymade could in no way have been accepted as an artwork, by the Society or by 
the state of art more broadly: as a reproduced industrial (and, in this sense, utter-
ly impersonal) object—Duchamp himself holding that one of the crucial ‘features’ 
of the readymade was in fact “its lack of uniqueness”20—Fountain fails miserably 
on each and every count. Were the readymade to be accepted as art, then the very 
definition of art would be rendered obsolete. 
And yet, as is well known, over the next half-century, this is precisely what hap-
pened. For far from disqualifying this non-exhibited urinal as art, the readymade-
event comes much closer to disqualifying art tout court. Indeed, as Duchamp’s 
biographer Calvin Tomkins (somewhat hyperbolically) states, the ultimate aim 
of his readymades was nothing less than “to deny the possibility of defining art.”21 
Moreover, it is for precisely this reason that Fountain’s effects must be understood 
as being ontological in nature, insofar as they reveal something about the very 
‘essence’ of art: not of one specific art form (such as painting or sculpture) but 
rather of art as a whole. Because what this work reveals is that all of the elements 
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that go into making an artwork—all of those base elements which, while abso-
lutely present (as its material substrate), nevertheless fail to be re-presented in the 
completed ‘work of art’—are themselves, in a very real sense, readymade objects. 
This is, after all, Duchamp’s fundamental point: the readymade lays claim to being 
a work of art for a very simple reason, which is that, at an ontological level (i.e. at 
the level of its being), all art is necessarily readymade. Or again, there is no art that 
is not, in some essential way, always-already readymade.22
In being ‘elevated’ to the level of art, the readymade thus reveals an important, 
if ambiguous truth about art itself, namely, that works of art require ordinary 
everyday objects in order to exist. Or to put it in more Badiouian terms, the read-
ymade-event clearly demonstrates the indiscernibility between art and non-art, an 
acknowledgement that the base material of art is, first and foremost, non-artistic. 
The ‘evental’ status of Fountain therefore lies foremost in the fact that it managed 
(metaontologically speaking) to elevate certain voided—and, fundamentally, 
common—elements from the level of non-presentation to that of re-presentation, or 
(on a phenomenological level) to raise that which had inexisted in art to a level of 
maximal existence. 
INAESTHETICS: ART AND PHILOSOPHY
It is at this point—as we consider the complicated relation of art to what-it-is-
not—that we might ask ourselves exactly what art means for Badiou. The first 
thing to note here is that, according to Badiou, whilst philosophy has an absolute 
need for art (being one of its structural conditions), art can itself easily make do 
without philosophy. This one-sided relationship is of course one of the principal 
reasons behind his rejection of traditional aesthetics—which he sees as solely 
concerned with establishing rules and hierarchies of ‘taste’—in favour of an ap-
proach to art that limits its interest to the manner by which art effectively thinks 
for itself, and thus might come to affect philosophy. 
Briefly, he calls this approach to art ‘inaesthetics’, which he defines as “a relation 
of philosophy to art that, maintaining that art is itself a producer of truths, makes 
no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy. Against aesthetic speculation, 
inaesthetics describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects produced by the in-
dependent existence of some works of art.”23 Of this definition we will suffice our-
selves for the moment by noting that, as a philosopher, one of Badiou’s foremost 
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concerns is to examine art—or rather particular arts; some arts—as constitutive 
of certain universal truths, and, as such, as having something essential to offer 
philosophy. 
Now, any reader with so much as a passing interest in Badiou’s thought will know 
that art constitutes one of the four generic conditions of his philosophy (along-
side politics, science, and love), and that philosophy, as he defines it, operates only 
inasmuch as it seizes these independent truths and places them in an immanent 
relation to one another. More than this, they will know that philosophy, accord-
ing to Badiou, is itself fundamentally truthless, being rather the unique discipline 
tasked with thinking the ‘compossibility’, or the mutual and non-contradictory 
co-existence, of the various (artistic, political, amorous and scientific) truths that 
litter the world (and that are themselves ultimately forms of thought). Or again, 
Badiou tells us that there are truths which exist out there, prior to and wholly inde-
pendent of philosophy, and that the latter’s job is precisely that of grasping these 
diverse truths and ‘re-thinking’ (or re-articulating) them in such a way that they 
can be brought together to cohere in a single system, which is finally what he calls 
a philosophy.24 So the relationship between art and philosophy (or indeed between 
philosophy and any of its conditions) is for Badiou ultimately a ‘thoughtful’ one, 
where philosophy is charged with re-thinking the thought that art first thinks.
To come full circle, it is philosophy’s structurally ‘secondary’ nature—its forever 
coming after truths—that leads Badiou to write off aesthetics in favour of ‘inaes-
thetics’ (which, as we have just seen, restricts itself to ‘the intraphilosophical ef-
fects produced by the existence of some works of art’). In a word, it is truths that 
prescribe philosophy, and philosophy does not condescend to its conditions. 
Returning then to Badiou’s definition of inaesthetics, it is important to highlight 
how this term designates moreover the philosophical recapitulation of a relation 
between art and truth that is at once singular and immanent. This relationship is 
absolutely crucial for Badiou and as such is worth pausing to consider in some 
detail.
First, the relationship between art and truth is singular inasmuch as every artistic 
truth is peculiar to the art in question. So, for example, a truth of painting won’t 
be found in poetry, just as music or photography are highly unlikely to produce 
any sculptural truths. This is in part a consequence of, on the one hand, Badiou’s 
adamant belief that the arts constitute fundamentally closed systems (no painting 
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is ever going to turn into music, just as no poem is ever going to become dance…), 
and, on the other, the fact that every truth, while universal in address, is always 
the truth of a particular situation, and in art this situation is generally (though not 
necessarily) the situation of a particular art. Or as Badiou puts it, every artistic 
truth exists “in a rigorous immanence to the art in question”:25 it is always a truth 
of this art, in this situation (and not another).
Parenthetically, it is at this point that some readers may be tempted to write Ba-
diou off as an antediluvian ‘high modernist’. To be sure, every so often it can ap-
pear as though he is recycling the (supposedly discredited) line of thought gener-
ally associated with the modernist project, namely, the idea that it is the exclusive 
commitment of each art to its proper medium that will finally allow it to lay bare 
its ‘pure form’ (or, as Badiou would have it, its ‘generic truth’). Now, while Badiou 
may well at times be arguing something not entirely dissimilar to this, we would 
be far off the mark were we to reduce his thought to this kind of Greenbergian 
‘autonomizing’ framework.26 While it is clear that for Badiou each art is entirely 
differentiated from the other arts (possessing its own form, its own possibilities, 
particular content and modes of expression, and so on…), it is important to re-
member that an artistic truth is always the truth of a particular (artistic) situation, 
and a ‘situation’, so far as Badiou conceives it, is an incredibly plastic concept, in-
sofar as it basically means any grouping whatsoever. So, for example, while Badiou 
praises someone like Kasimir Malevich—and in particular his 1918 suprematist 
masterpiece White on White—for giving us “the generic truth of painting’s singular 
situation”,27 he can equally celebrate someone like Duchamp, whose readymades 
arguably explode the very idea of medium-specificity and expose something vital 
in the artistic situation at large.
There is however another important thread to the inaesthetic knot tying together 
art, truth and philosophy, namely, that of immanence. For Badiou holds that the 
relationship between these three terms—art, truth and philosophy—is not only 
singular but also immanent, insofar as every artistic work must be wholly present 
to the truth it fabricates. This is a slightly more delicate point, and results from 
Badiou’s materialist conception of truths, the general idea being that an artistic 
truth (or any truth for that matter)—despite its infinite nature—isn’t simply the 
truth of a situation, but is moreover itself situated. That is to say, it takes place in 
a world. 
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To summarize brutally: Badiou holds that an artistic truth is always embodied 
in an identifiable ‘artistic configuration’, whose origins lie in a vanished event—
which suddenly (and inexplicably) gives form to what was previously formless—
and whose entire body is composed of the manifold artworks that belong to this 
configuration. Meaning that each individual artwork serves as the very fabric from 
which its truth is gradually woven. This ‘weaving’ can, in principle, of course go 
on forever (one can always create another work x exploring the consequences of 
artistic event y…). Hence the infinity of a truth is in no way confined to a single 
finite work, but rather comprises an essentially infinite—or indeed, ‘eternal’—se-
quence of works. 
As such, the entire ‘being’ of an artistic truth is located within its works, works 
which remain fundamentally outside of artistic ‘knowledge’ (or outside of ‘the 
state of art’), and as such can proceed solely by chance (this radical subtraction 
from knowledge being precisely why they constitute a mode of thought). To this 
end, each individual work figures something like an investigation or an ‘enquiry’ 
into the truth that it actualizes, piece by painstaking piece. 
So to sum up, Badiou defines an artistic truth as a material configuration that, is-
suing from an event, and unfolding by chance alone, comprises an (in principle) 
infinite complex of works. Or again, to think art as both singular and immanent to 
truth—that is, to think inaesthetically—is for Badiou one and the same as to (re)
think an artistic configuration.
The disappearing act
So far our thinking about the readymade qua event has focused primarily on two 
key features, being its site—which is less the exhibition itself than the unpre-
sented ‘everyday’ matter underlying the artwork (or its ‘base’ material)—and its 
illegality in the eyes of the state. What we need to do now is turn our attention 
to the remaining ‘evental’ points of Fountain’s non-exhibition, specifically: its ap-
pearing only to disappear; its figuring (at least initially) as an absolutely abstract 
work; and its ultimate transformation of the situation whence it emerged. In do-
ing so we will be able to say something crucial about the event itself. 
Regarding the first of these points (Fountain’s appearing-disappearing), we should 
first of all reiterate the fact that Duchamp’s urinal, which is to say the work itself, 
was almost immediately lost. Discarded as garbage, or perhaps burnt or stolen: 
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no one really knows. What is known is that it was absent from the Society of In-
dependent Artists’ exhibition as well as its catalogue, and was never seen again 
(all the various ‘Fountains’ housed in galleries and museums today are of course 
replicas). In point of fact, Fountain would almost certainly have been entirely for-
gotten were it not for the publication in The Blind Man—Duchamp’s own review, 
no less—of a brief article in defence of the work entitled ‘The Richard Mutt Case’, 
which included Stieglitz’s photo of the urinal, captioned ‘The exhibit refused by 
the Independents’.28
In other words, after having effectively engineered Fountain’s refusal—for Duch-
amp not only entered the offending urinal into the exhibition knowing full well 
it would be rejected, but also sat on the jury and remained silent during its delib-
erations, never once revealing his identity as the nefarious ‘R. Mutt’—Duchamp 
then went on to use his own review to denounce this very same refusal. In this 
way, Duchamp paradoxically did succeed in exhibiting his urinal, in a manner of 
speaking, through the very act of denouncing the fact that it was not exhibited 
in the first place. That is to say, Duchamp’s presumed authorship of ‘The Rich-
ard Mutt Case’ (the article itself was unsigned) essentially ensured that the non-
appearance—or the inexistence—of Fountain was in fact retroactively rendered as 
an intense appearance through the subsequent exhibition of its very non-exhibition. 
Or again, with the publication of The Blind Man piece, the readymade suddenly 
became intensely apparent through its very inappearance. 
Thus, as with Badiou’s event, the coincidence of Fountain’s appearing-disappear-
ing did in fact manage to leave a definite trace, in the form of a (published) affir-
mation not only of its claim to artistry, but moreover of non-art’s integral relation 
to art itself. Far from vanishing without a trace, the readymade-event contrarily 
performed the ultimate disappearing act, by turning its very disappearance into an 
‘act’. 
Appearing-disappearing to one side, Fountain is not without consequence for the 
crucial inaesthetic concept of singularity. Indeed, when we think of Duchamp’s 
readymades, perhaps the most immediate problem we run up against is that of 
artistic indiscernibility, or the paradoxical fact that such objects cannot be said to 
belong exclusively to either the rarefied world of ‘art’—and even if they did, we 
cannot help but wonder: which art?29—or the everyday world of common, banal 
objects. For in “eliciting notions of aesthetic value while asserting its utter aes-
thetic valuelessness”,30 the readymade in fact pulls in two different directions: 
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simultaneously art and non-art, it belongs, in an ontological sense—at the level 
of its very being—to two fundamentally opposed registers. Structurally speaking, 
the readymade is thus, as Formis observes, an intervallic object:31 it presents itself 
as the ‘interval’ between the event and the everyday, between art and non-art, 
between avant-garde novelty and the familiarity of the ancien régime. 
Now Duchamp himself famously theorized this intervallic structure of the ready-
made in terms of what he called an “infrathin separative difference”,32 that is, an 
indiscernible or ‘minimal difference’, not unlike the in-difference that Badiou iso-
lates in Malevich’s (otherwise conspicuously non-Duchampian) painting White on 
White (between ground and form; between white and white…).33 An object is ‘in-
frathin’, Duchamp claims, when it exhibits an “indifferent difference”,34 or when 
two separate parts of its nature cannot be differentiated; when, in effect, we en-
counter the null “difference of the Same”.35 
Just as the infrathin establishes a sort of ‘differential identity’, blurring the line 
that separates two otherwise distinct things, likewise the readymade organizes an 
‘indifferent difference’ between the work of art and the everyday object, rendering 
this distinction effectively indiscernible. Certainly, Fountain does not cease to be 
an industrially fabricated urinal simply because Duchamp chose it, signed it (as 
‘R. Mutt’), and (almost) exhibited it. And yet, at the same time, its being chosen, 
signed and (non)exhibited nonetheless distinguishes it from every other industri-
ally fabricated object, and indeed from all the banal everyday objects littering the 
world. Fountain thus exhibits a peculiar double-structure: it “presents its unity as 
a work of art plus the multiplicity of all the urinals that are similar to it”.36 Being 
at the time the sole object to partake of such paradoxical double-belonging, the 
readymade could then be said to belong to its own unique category: that of the 
‘readymade’. Meaning that the readymade, like the event itself, auto-belongs; it 
belongs exclusively to itself. Whence the simultaneous undecidability and auton-
omy of the readymade-event: beyond its aesthetic—or rather, inaesthetic—unity, 
it also displays its industrial multiplicity.37 Or again, it presents itself, at one and 
the same time, as a single, discrete work of art, and as the universe of everyday 
objects. 
As such, ever since the readymade-event, the world of art and the everyday world 
have become, at least to an extent, indiscernible, inasmuch as today any object 
whatsoever can be understood as having artistic potential, or the potential to be-
come art, just as any rarefied work of art has the potential to enter into an intense 
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relation with the everyday. What is key here is the fact that, in affirming that the 
very material of art is first and foremost non-artistic, the readymade-event equal-
ly points to the fact that it is art’s non-artistic material that becomes art. Indeed, 
it is precisely for this reason that Badiou can hold, at one and the same time, that 
“art is pure Idea”,38 and that “the real of art comprises an ideal impurity”.39 For, 
as the readymade-event so perfectly demonstrates, impurity is in fact a necessary 
condition—even a fundamental law—of art, for the simple reason that art, real 
art, always involves the formalization of what was previously formless, the radical 
becoming-art of what was heretofore considered non-art (or what, according to 
the artistic world in question, did not previously exist). 
It is moreover precisely for this reason that all true artworks—and the ready-
made, as we have shown, is certainly not immune on this count—initially appear 
in the situation as absolutely abstract works, inasmuch as such art is, from the 
first, “abstracted from all particularity” and at the same time “formalizes this act 
of abstraction.”40 After all, true art, in its essential (evental) novelty, necessarily 
appears as something wholly abstract to the world in which it appears (such ‘ab-
straction’ deriving, as we have seen, from the fact that it falls outside the realm of 
available knowledges). As such, Badiou’s call for a ‘purification’ of the arts, all to 
often misinterpreted as a naïve plea for a return to modernist sensibilities, should 
conversely be understood as being, on the one hand, a destructive gesture (one 
that eliminates ‘apparent’ impurities), and on the other, a fundamentally creative 
movement (one that formalises or brings into form what was previously formless, 
or ‘pure-ifies’ what was impure).
In fact, the case of Fountain perfectly illustrates the dual nature of the ‘subtractive 
procedure’ itself as simultaneously an act of drawing under and of drawing forth. 
While Malevich’s work, for example, embodies the subtractive process primar-
ily in terms of ‘dis-appearance’ (of form, of colour, of space…)41—and thus as a 
movement toward ‘purity’ (understood here as medium specificity)—Duchamp’s 
readymades contrarily illustrate its constructive side, as something that raises from 
beneath (hence ‘sub-traction’, i.e. ‘pulling from under’): far from isolating the 
‘thing itself ’ by purging it of its inherent complications and impurities, Fountain 
contrarily establishes the impure as the basis from which all purity is constructed, 
exposing the infrathin minimal difference between art and its subjacent non-ar-
tistic material. 
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So once the readymade-event has taken place—after it has been affirmed as in-
deed belonging to the world of art—a certain equivalence between art and non-art 
is established, whereby it becomes equally possible to consider a representational 
object (like a work of art) as a presentational one (i.e. an ordinary, banal object), 
and vice versa.42 In other words, the readymade-event doesn’t simply open up a 
‘positive’ passage from non-art to art; it also establishes a corollary passage from 
art to non-art. And it is of course at this precise juncture that we have located the 
readymade’s decisive operation of indiscernibility. 
That being said, obviously the readymade doesn’t belong to both the art world 
and the everyday world in the same manner. Simply, while the readymade-event 
demonstrates how all art emerges from non-art, this is not to say that all non-art 
will become art. Or again, while the everyday world is the indisputable source of 
the readymade (the urinal being, after all, not in the first instance an intention-
ally artistic work, but rather the product of technical industry), it is the world of 
art that figures its ultimate determination (as the readymade leads to a profound 
transformation of both artistic procedure and understanding). 
It is, moreover, precisely this intentionality that defines both the evental nature 
of the readymade, and, reciprocally, the readymade nature of the event itself. For 
like the readymade, the event is itself doubly subtracted from the situation, in the 
sense that it is at once drawn under by the logic of the world in question (contra-
vening its laws and thus appearing only to disappear) and at the same time drawn 
forth from its detritus, being entirely composed of the very material deemed to be 
most insignificant by the current ‘world order’ (so much so that it fails to appear 
in this world, or that, ontologically speaking, it altogether lacks state representa-
tion). 
Thus the event, whilst figuring on the one hand as a sudden and absolute rupture, 
equally represents a kind of paradoxical continuity, whereby the order of things is 
in reality only minimally (or ‘infinitesimally’) subverted such that two elements 
which were, ontologically speaking, always there, merely come to exchange posi-
tions. 
Hence the simple and immediately apparent truth declared by the readymade (a 
truth that extends well beyond the confines of art, reverberating equally through 
all the generic fields): just as all art has its roots in non-art, so too the event has 
its foundation—indeed, its entire being—in the everyday. Or again, far from being 
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a ‘miracle’, the event is in truth nothing other than the spontaneous revelation of 
what was there all along. Every event, no matter how radical, exposes us not only 
to the shock but also the schlock of the new. 
Western Sydney University
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